Friday, September 25, 2020

Reasons Why We Should Believe in Free Will Whether It Exists Or Not (Perspectives Part 4)

September 25, 2020 2

One of the assignments from the philosophy course I took this summer was to design a philosophical comic strip that outlined a key metaphysical concept of our choice. Now, I'm no Bill Watterson but between my limited comedy writing skills and my best friend's compensating artistic talent, this is what we were able to come up with. 


Hopefully it goes without saying, but the philosophical concept I chose to comicize was determinism, which along with the concept of free will and the perhaps less-well-known theory of compatibalism, has drastic implications both on the future, as well as on each individual's present, daily lives.


You've probably heard of free will before it's the theory that human beings have the ability to make their own conscious choices that have influence over the future. Free will permits us to act at our own discretion without the constraints of necessity or fate. 


Determinism on the other hand, is the idea that all our choices are already predetermined, and that there is nothing anyone can do to change the past, present, or future. There are a couple different approaches to determinism, including causal determinism which theorizes that cause and effect relationships invariably lead from one to the other to determine the future, theological determinism which theorizes that a God determines the future, and biological determinism which concludes that the genetic programming of living creatures establishes everything they do, which consequently determines the future. Each of these methods differs from the others, but fundamentally, they all suggest an external influence, independent from human will, that has authority over human action and human thought. 


And if you're having trouble coming to terms with the implications of free will or determinism, perhaps you'll be more inclined to adopt compatibilism, which in simplest terms, is a compromise between the two theories. A compatibilist would suggest that humans get a small amount of options in an essentially determined universe. If the universe was a road trip, compatibilism might allow you to choose the radio station and snacks for the drive, even though you have no say in the destination.


The Determinist Argument

One of the first defenses of determinism was published by mathematical physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace in 1814. It was a thought experiment called Laplace's Demon. In order to prove determinism, Laplace proposed that if a someone (in his example, a demon) were capable of knowing the precise location and momentum of every single atom in the universe, their past and future could be calculated by the laws of classical mechanics and cause and effects. Like many other mathemacian philosophers, Laplace believed that the randomness we perceive is simply an epistemic consequence of human ignorance, and that free will is an illusion born from complexity. 

Laplace's Demon, although it is thought-provoking, isn't backed up by any meaningful evidence beyond Laplace's assumptions. Since 1814 however, determinists have become more determined than ever to provide sufficient arguments. 


The sufficiency of these arguments began to emerge about 150 years ago with the intellectual revolution that accompanied the publication of Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species. Because even though Darwin's work never explicitly states the implications that his theory of evolution has on free will and determinism, they were drawn out by his cousin, Sir Francis Galton. Galton concluded that if we have evolved, then mental faculties like intelligence must be hereditary. But we use those faculties to make decisions, so our ability to choose our fate is not free, but depends on our biological inheritance.


More recently, neuroscience research on the inner workings of the brain has conducted further investigation to Galton's theory. Modern brain scanners now allow us to look inside a living person's skull, revealing intricate networks of neurons that determine our thoughts, hopes, and memories. Thanks to this technology, neuroscientists have reached a general consensus that these networks are shaped both by genes and environment.  And American psychologist Benjamin Libet took this discovery one step further in the 1980's when he proved that the electrical activity that builds up in a person's brain before they, say, move their arm, occurs before the person even makes the conscious decision to move.


If these arguments are too technical, many determinists consider how changes to brain chemistry can alter behaviour. Between alcohol and antipsychotics— not to mention the way fully-matured adults can become murderers or pedophiles after developing tumors in their brains— human decisions can clearly be effected by chemical balances in the brain, and thus many argue that humans are dependent on the physical properties of their grey matter and nothing more.


The Free Will Argument

A lot of free will adherents would call on German philosopher Immanuel Kant's arguments against determinism, which touch on a concept that the Christian tradition would label our "moral liberty." Essentially, humans have an undeniable innate obligation to chose between right over wrong, which is made apparent through the inherent guilt we feel when we neglect that duty, and as Kant put it, "if we are not free to choose, then it would make no sense to say we ought to choose the path of righteousness." Of course, some would suggest that we don't ought to choose the path of righteousness, but this counterargument is simply ignorant to the structures our society is based on. Incarceration systems, the Nobel Peace Prize, and everything in between is more or less established on a universal accountability for doing the right thing.


But moral liberty aside, one of the biggest problems I have with determinism is that it contains a logical fallacy. The fact that a determinist would even attempt to convince others of their position shows that they rely on the free will and volition of the people they are trying to convince. The theory of determinism implies that everything, including an individual's thoughts and beliefs, are determined by some kind of preexisting cause, which means it would be impossible to change another person's stance.


* * * * * 


As you're probably discovering, free will and determinism are far more complex and far less fathomable than they're often credited as. But whether you're compelled by the implications of the free will argument, convinced by the assertions of the determinist argument, or merely disoriented and confused by it all, assumptions of free will run through every aspect of our lives. From politics, welfare provisions and incarceration to world sports championships and Academy Awards, a general acceptance of free will is the foundation for a functioning society. I mean, can we really justify imprisoning criminals for crimes they had no choice but to commit? And are anyone's accomplishments truly deserving of praise if they were simply predetermined? Even the century-old American dream— the belief that anyone can make something of themselves regardless of their start in life— is entirely based on the ideals of conscious, intentional choice.


The importance of free will also transcends society's constructs, and appertains to individual moral conduct. A 2002 study was conducted by psychologist Kathleen Vohs and Jonathon Schooler, in which one group of participants was asked to read a passage arguing that free will was false, and another group was given a passage that was neutral on the topic of free will. Each group was then asked to perform a number of tasks (eg. take a math test in which cheating was made easy, or hand in an unsealed envelope full of loose change), and the participants who were conditioned to deny free will were proven more likely to behave immorally.


There is advantage to regarding free will as real, not because it is necessarily true (although I believe it is), but because, in the words of Barack Obama, "values are rooted in a basic optimism about life and a faith in free will."


And that's why we should believe in free will whether it exists or not.

Friday, September 18, 2020

Reasons Why I Won't "Play Santa" With My Future Kids (Perspectives Part 3)

September 18, 2020 3
Your Kid's Brain On Santa Claus : Shots - Health News : NPR

When I was a kid, my parents never engaged my siblings or me with the Santa Claus story. It wasn't that they thought it was immoral per say; Santa was just never something we did as a family. For a while, the height of my understanding was that Santa was nothing more than a television character just a fictitious accessory to make Christmas more fun. So maybe it's simply because I don't have much experience in the Santa department, but nonetheless, I can't help but wonder what role his story plays in a family's dynamics, and whether or not that kind of deception is as innocent as we take it for. In other words, I can't help but wonder whether teaching kids about Santa is "right" or "wrong."


The criteria for what is "right" and what is "wrong" has been debated by philosophers for generations, and there are countless different approachescalled "ethical normative systems" that aim at providing concrete answers. These systems, although they are widely diverse, can be divided into three broad categories: virtue ethics, duty ethics, and consequential ethics.


Virtue Ethics

Without getting into too much detail, virtue ethics defines "right and wrong" as having to do with the "doer" of an action. It emphasizes an individual's moral character rather than their actions or the outcome of their actions. There are a couple of theories that accompany virtue ethics, but perhaps the most notable is Aristotelian ethics. 

Aristotle believed that all things had a function that if performed sufficiently would result in eternal eudaemonia (blessedness and prosperity), and he considered the function of humans to be their faculty of reason. Thus, a virtuous person wasn't one who followed a series of moral guidelines because in Aristotle's model there are no moral guidelines but rather someone who carried out their constitutional function and would automatically be able to choose the "right" action by their innate ability to reason.

There are other branches of virtue ethics such as Thomistic Ethics, Buddhism, and Confucianism, but fundamentally, each of these approaches share their emphasis on moral character in common.

Duty Ethics

While virtue ethics deals with the "doer" of an action, duty ethics (or deontology) deals with the action itself. A deontologist would suggest that there are specific standards that exist to guide our actions, and everything else the intent behind our actions, the outcome of our actions, the perceptions of our actions is extraneous. All that matters is that we follow the moral rules. 

A good example of deontology is Kantian ethics, more commonly called the categorical imperative. Introduced in German philosopher Immanuel Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals, the categorical imperative presents specific rules of conduct that are unconditional and absolute, the validity of which does not depend on any desire or outcome. "Thou shalt not steal," for instance, is a categorical imperative that differs from the hypothetical imperative that would result from the influence of wants, such as "do not steal if you want to be popular."

Other examples of deontology include theistic normative ethics, which suggest a Supreme Being that indicates what humans should and should not do, and the pluralistic theory of duty, which is a little more complicated.


Consequential Ethics

Consequentialism is the idea that an act is not considered to be "good" based on the virtue of its doer, nor by the features of act itself, but rather by the outcome of the act. The concept is exhibited in a variety of different ethical normative systems, such as the rational self-interest theory and existentialism, but arguably the most eminent application of consequentialism is utilitarianism.

At its core, utilitarianism evaluates actions based on how useful they are to bringing about pleasure and happiness. English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham developed hedonism, which is a quantitative, mathematical view of morality. Essentially, it rates all actions, big or small, based on how "happy making" they are. And although hedonism makes ethics far simpler and much more objective, it also raises a number of moral dilemmas, one of which is a thought experiment dubbed the "trolley problem." You may have heard of it before—  a runaway trolley is barreling down the railway tracks. Five people are tied to the tracks ahead, directly in the path of the uncontrolled trolley. You are standing next to a lever, and by pulling it, you can switch the trolley to a different set of tracks, to which one person is tied. Do you: a) do nothing and allow the trolley to kill the five people in its path, or b) pull the lever to divert the trolley onto the other set of railway tracks, killing the one person and sparing the five?

Well, a utilitarian would look at it mathematically. The act of killing one person is exactly four lives more ethical than the act of killing five people. The trolley problem is an effective model for the implications of consequential practice.

* * * * * 

After that brief yet extensive metaphysics crash course, you may be wondering how Santa Claus ties in. Well, between the official NORAD Santa Tracker and Canada Post's individual responses to Santa letters, our culture has made teaching your kid about Santa Claus to be as expected of you as teaching your kid to ride a bike without training wheels. But if you take a moment to remove cultural and nostalgic biases from the Santa narrative, it becomes little more than a trivial lie which, depending on the ethical normative system you may have adopted, can either be seen as right or wrong. Duty ethics doesn't leave much room for the defense of Santa; Kant's categorical imperative would say lying is always wrong, regardless of how happy that lie might make a 4-year-old on Christmas morning. But a consequential ethicist might argue that the positive outcomes of the Santa story outweighs the deceit and dishonesty.

One of these positive outcomes is supported by child psychologist Jacqueline D. Wooley, who sums up the argument when she writes "not only do children have the tools to ferret out the truth; but engaging with the Santa story may give them a chance to exercise these abilities." Essentially, Wooley argues that lying about Santa teaches children to be analytical and skeptical, which ultimately allows them to grow into free-thinkers who do not trust people blindly but use their own inferencing skills to decipher the truth for themselves. But there is so much deception in a child's social life that I can't see how adding the existence of a giant magical elf is necessary. Besides, when a child is at that stage of their life where they are learning to distinguish between fact and fiction (which according to a 2006 issue of Child Development starts at age 4, right in the midst of their Santa-believing years), it can't be beneficial to their psychological development for their parents, the people they trust the most, to present fiction as fact so elaborately.

When kids discover the truth, it can also affect their trust in their parents. Not permanently of course, but certainly for a time. I mean, if something as verified as Santa Claus—  and for that matter, the tooth fairy, the Easter bunny, etc—  was a lie, then what else can't be trusted? My family is religious, and one of the reasons my parent's didn't play Santa for my siblings and me is because when we discovered that the existence of an all-good, all-powerful man who flies across the sky rewarding our goodness and punishing our faults was complete fiction, then why should we believe them when they tell us about God?

Another common argument against Santa is that usually, at least for the beginning (and most formative years) of a child's life, their parents and family make up the entirety of their role models. And if those role models lie about Santa, it sends the message that it's okay to lie. Santa encourages a "do as I say, not as I do" style of raising kids.

But even if none of these arguments are sound, the main qualm I have against the Santa story is that it teaches that only good children get presents. But what do the implications of this teaching say about children from families that are less well-off? Consider a child's sense of self-worth if their parents can't afford to play Santa and reward their goodness with material gifts. The Santa narrative says that the better the child, the more bountiful the bottom of their Christmas tree, but that's a toxic way to look at the world, both for the children taught that they aren't good enough, and for the children taught that goodness will always protect them from adversity.

Douglas College philosopher Kira Tomsons says: "neither social stigma nor the risk of missing out on traditional holiday fairy tales lessens the moral importance of disclosure." The brief happiness that Santa Claus causes 4-year-olds for one month a year doesn't negate the lasting consequences of the deception that accompanies that joy. And that's why I won't "play Santa" with my future kids.

Saturday, September 12, 2020

"Comfort and Joy" (a Short Story)

September 12, 2020 1

 Northridge Long-Term Care was a humble building. Its roughly 5 000 square feet of housing were crumbling around the edges, its gardens were overrun by weeds, and its plumbing malfunctioned more often than it worked. No doubt the modest little facility undermined the state’s building code, but either the municipal officials couldn’t be bothered to care, or the Northridge staff found enough loopholes to get around the bylaws. The building was in a small neighbourhood afterall, and despite many an onlooker’s apprehensions, its residents were contented in the tight-knit community they found themselves in. Each of the staff members knew each of the residents by name, and if anything, it was more like a summer camp than it was a retirement home.


And if Northridge Long-Term Care was a summer camp, then Mr. Dalton Conners, one of the more senior residents, played the role of the outsider. In one sense or another, all social gatherings— big or small, old or young— have one, and retirement homes are certainly no exception. Mr. Conners fit the description flawlessly.


It wasn’t that his appearance was particularly unusual. In fact, his was comparable to that of any of the other residents. He was of average height, and like the majority of his peers, most of his features were masked behind the wrinkles and sagging skin that manifested in his old-age. Mr. Conners’ peculiarity lay not in his looks, but rather in his behaviour. He was quiet and reserved, and besides the bi-weekly dance classes (which he attended but never participated in) he kept to himself. 


Northridge Long-Term Care had no record of any of Mr. Conners’ relatives, as all of the Conners had long since either passed or moved away, so with no visitors to entertain him and few friends to amuse him, Mr. Conners spent most of his time alone in his room. He would sit on his rocking chair for hours, staring at the wall with his heavy eyes glazed over, sometimes humming tunelessly to himself, but more often silent. Whenever someone made efforts to engage him in conversation, an occurrence that was far less likely than it once was, he showed no signs of acknowledgment. 


Indeed, Dalton Conners seemed to dwell in his own desolate realm, which existed somewhere between ignorant bliss and amnesic helplessness. 


In fact, at one point Northridge saw it fit to bring in a neurologist, a middle-aged beer-bellied balding-at-the-crown doctor, to run some diagnostic tests for amnesia. Nothing amounted from them except that Mr. Conners became somewhat of an anomaly. Because even though he failed every attempt at cognitive testing, the MRIs, CT scans, and blood tests all came back negative. Poor Mr. Conners was not blind but unseeing, not deaf but unaware, not mute but silent. And after that disheartening visit from the doctor, it could be said with certainty that although he was not amnesic, the empty, unfortunate soul lacked retentive memory.  


One evening— well enough into December that mistletoe hung with flourish from the banisters, and yet not so late into the season that the early nights and wintry weather had begun to take its toll— the residents of Northridge were being ushered into the corridor by nurses and staff alike clad head-to-toe in Christmas colours. 


“We’ve got a special treat lined up for you guys,” Mrs. Hanson, the receptionist said with hushed excitement. She was pushing a woman’s wheelchair down the hallway where the rest of the residents were congregating, and as she walked, she leaned down to speak clearly into the woman’s ear. “I think you’re really gonna like it.”


Mrs. Hansen helped the woman park her chair, then headed up to the front of the crowd with the rest of the staff. “Right then, is that everyone?” she asked one of the nurses, clasping her hands and smiling towards the assembly of wheelchairs and walkers. 


“Almost,” was the hesitant reply. “Did you want us to bring, you know…” the nurse nodded her head in the direction of Mr. Dalton Connors’ firmly closed door. Unlike the entrances to the other residents’ rooms, Mr. Connors’ door wasn’t adorned with photographs of grandchildren, Christmas cards from loved ones, or childhood knickknacks. Other than the nametag fixed to the exterior, the door was completely bare. 


The staff looked at the door and then at each other. 


“Alright folks, that’s everyone!” Mrs. Hansen declared, clapping her hands together and addressing the expectant crowd. “Some of you have probably heard of Lillian Public School, just down the street from here.” A few excited claps and smiles emerged from the group. “Well, we have a few carolers from L.P.S. waiting in the lobby to sing to you folks.” As the receptionist, Mrs. Hansen was relatively unused to addressing the seniors at Northridge, and her voice had an inflection not unlike that of a grandparent addressing an infant, or a child addressing a puppy. 


At Mrs. Hansen’s invitation, a group of fifteen or twenty schoolchildren ranging in age from kindergartners to preteens, arranged themselves— altos on the left, sopranos on the right, and tenors and basses centerstage— and opened their songbooks. Each of them stood perfectly stone-faced and mannerly, a conduct which held far more pertinence in a classroom than in a Christmas concert, but which all the children conducted nonetheless. 


All but one, that is. Though his peers held themselves as stiff and as rigid as posts on a fence, Oliver Jones’ drooping posture betrayed his indignation. He was a blonde-haired, blue-eyed 12-year-old schoolboy with a dimpled babyface and boyish freckles. His choir uniform, which he wore with obvious objection, hung from his skinny, twig-like limbs like curtains from a rod.


Oliver’s discomfort wasn’t born out of sheepishness nor insecurity, but rather from the impression that singing Christmas carols with 5-year-old “babies” for a bunch of “old geezers” (as he would have put it) was below him. Nevertheless, he took out his songbook with the rest of his classmates, and mouthed the words listlessly.


“God rest ye merry gentlemen, let nothing you dismay.

Remember Christ our Saviour was born on Christmas day.”


Despite Oliver’s spiritless contribution, the children’s voices carried the haunting melody through the ancient retirement home. It trickled down the corridor down like a brook, washed past the peeling wallpaper on which generations of dust had settled, and crept into the crumbling skeleton framework of the building itself. 


“To save us all from Satan’s pow’r when we had gone astray,

O tidings of comfort and joy.”


Some of the less senior residents sang along as best they could, some clapped rhythmlessly, and still others listened contentedly, eyes closed and mouths smiling. 


“From God our Heavenly Father a blessed angel came;

And unto certain shepherds brought tidings of the same.”


From somewhere in the audience, an older woman started laughing brightly, and though the noise had escaped from lips that were cracked and shrunken with age, the laugh’s timbre was as youthful and ecstatic as that of a child in a chocolate shop. Mrs. Hansen started towards the woman to prevent further outburst, but another round of laughter had the receptionist doubling back, smiling to herself and shaking her head.


“How that in Bethlehem was born the Son of God by name.

O tidings of comfort and joy.”


Oliver Jones was less charmed by the woman’s burst of joy, and exasperation finally taking over, he rolled his eyes and pulled away from the group. His getaway was made easy, because his tenor voice— which had him at the center of the choir— as well as his lanky build— which had him at the back— allowed him to slip away unnoticed. With every disoriented step the boy took through the unfamiliar hallway, the echo of children’s dulcet voices faded further and further into the distance, and eventually it was replaced by a soft, ethereal voice, so angelic that it outdid the children’s choir entirely. 


“‘Fear not then,’ said the angel. ‘Let nothing you affright.’”


The voice was coming from inside a firmly closed door. Compared to the other doors Oliver had walked begrudgingly past, this one was unusually bare. There weren’t any of the grainy black-and-white pictures, Get Well Soon cards, or plastic ornaments that were plastered across the other entrances, and had it not been for the tiny voice escaping through the gap at the bottom, Oliver would have taken the room for a supply closet or a staff washroom.


“‘This day is born a Saviour of a pure virgin bright.’”


Unsure of what was moving him to do so, Oliver slowly turned the doorknob and poked his head tentatively inside. The room was musty and dark, but through the light that poured in from the fluorescently-lit hallway, Oliver could make out two sunken, half-closed eyes staring back at him from a rocking chair in the corner. 


“Hello?” Oliver said in a hushed voice. It didn’t seem appropriate to disturb the ghostly ambiance. 


The man slowly lifted his head and turned his grey eyes towards his unexpected visitor. “Who’s there?” he croaked. Unlike the divine resonance of his singing voice, his speech was ancient and cracked with age. “Who are you?”


“I’m Oliver, sir. I’m one of the carolers,” the boy introduced himself, before his conscience prompted him to add, nonchalantly, “well, not really. I don’t exactly sing.”


“Pity.” The man sighed. His voice’s cadence was choppy, and he seemed to select his words carefully as though each one was of acute cruciality.


“There ain’t nothin’ pitiful about it,” Oliver scoffed, suddenly defensive. His recalcitrance had always been met with discipline by teachers, admiration by friends, even mockery by peers, but it had certainly never been ‘pitied’ by anyone. “I got plenty to fill my time without affiliating with them sissies.”


“Seems as you do,” the man concurred, although by the way he gazed exaggeratedly around the dreary, lifeless bedroom, it was clear that he didn’t consider his own company to be any worthier of Oliver’s time than that of a bunch of ‘sissies.’ “If you don’t sing, then why are you in your little choir in the first place?”


“My mother enrolled me. Said it would be a ‘humbling experience,’ singin’ for you folks.”


“Reckon you should obey her. Might do you a world of good.”


“Reckon you should mind your own business,’ Oliver retorted. He had briefly forgotten he was in the presence of a man who was altogether stranger, elder, and host. Any of those titles alone would have been reason enough for Oliver to behave himself, but together, they should have produced in him a perfect gentleman. 


“Might do you a world of good,” the man repeated. He was looking at the carpeted floor, but something told Oliver he wasn’t fully present. An angonizingly silent moment passed, and the man lifted his eyes once more. On meeting Oliver’s gaze, a bewilderment passed over his face. “Who are you?” he demanded, visibly perplexed.


“Uh, I’m Oliver, remember? Oliver Jones.” 


“What are you doing here, Oliver Remember Oliver Jones?” His voice had a new, almost accusatory tone that contrasted his previous far-off way of speaking. “Shouldn’t you be off singing with the rest of your little group?”


“I couldn’t be bothered to finish the concert.” Oliver stated, equally confused as he was intrigued. 


“Pity,” the man said once again, this time with unmistakable contempt. “What I wouldn’t give to have a sturdy set of lungs like yours.”


“Why, your singing is simply brilliant. I daresay it should be you out there leading the choir.”


“Don’t suppose they be needin’ me out there.”


“Why not?” Oliver asked imploringly.


“I dunno,” the man said, bluntly. Narrowing his eyes and pursing his lips, he added, “Just don’t go missing out while ya still have the choice not to.” He nodded in the direction of the singing schoolchildren, whose final verses could barely be heard over the hum of the ceiling fan and the rocking of the man’s chair.


“I don’t suppose they do need you out there,” Oliver mused, consciously avoiding any talk of his singing and purposefully directing the conversation back to the man. “Although I don’t suppose they need any of ‘em other old folks either.”


“What do you mean?”


“Well they’re gettin’ paid to look after you, ain’t they? So maybe it ain’t really about their needs after all.” Oliver wasn’t entirely sure what he was getting at, but he couldn’t help thinking back to that radiant, transparent laughter from the woman in the hallway. “Seems to me you need that music in here more’n anyone.”


“Who are you?”


“What are you playing at? I’m O-L-I-V-E-R. I’m trying to help you.”


“Hello, Oliver.” The man closed his eyes and nodded his head enthusiastically to the distant melody. “Listen. Ya hear that? Wonder where it’s comin’ from.”


“Quit jokin’ around.”


“It’s a beautiful tune, ain’t it?”


Oliver’s bafflement mingled with his exasperation. “It’s ‘God Rest Ye Merry Gentlemen.’ You were just singing it before.”


“It sounds perfectly elegant.” And then once more, “who are you?”


“I’m— oh, what does it matter.”


“Who are you?” the man repeated. “What are you doin’ here?” Genuine terror started to creep across his face until his eyes were wide and his body was tense. “What are you doin’ here?” he demanded again.


“I’m on my way out,” Oliver whispered. He made his way to the exit, knowing better than to further trigger the man’s fluster. He reached the door, and as he turned the knob, he paused to look back at the old man. “You know, you should really take your own advice. That is, don’t go missing out while you still have the choice not to.” At that, Oliver turned from his erratic host, slipped into the hallway, and gently closed the plain, undecorated door behind him. As soon as the door clicked shut, an astoundingly breathtaking melody emerged once again from behind it. 


“Now to the Lord sing praises, all you within this place.

And with true love and brotherhood, each other now embrace.”


Oliver turned and ran down the hallway, songbook in hand, to catch up with the rest of his classmates just as they were chanting the hymn’s final chorus.


 

Friday, September 11, 2020

Reasons Why I Believe in God (Perspectives Part 2)

September 11, 2020 4

Aside from being my personal favourite comic, Calvin and Hobbes is one of the most popular comic strips of all time, both because of its enrapturing storytelling and its brilliant philosophical influences. It follows the childhood adventures of six-year-old Calvin, who is just as precocious as he is rambunctious, and his stuffed tiger Hobbes. And while these quirky and lovable title characters can be taken as nothing more than such, it's certainly no coincidence that their namesakes are 16th-century theologian John Calvin and 17th-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. There are countless examples of strips that have underlying academic themes, and the following is one of my (many) favourites. 


Watterson, Bill - Calvin and Hobbes (23 Dec 1987) | WIST

 

Leave it to Calvin to perfectly outline a 400-year-old metaphysical concept. 


Pascal's Wager is an argument presented by French theologian Balise Pascal, which suggest that one's belief in God is a bet on their own life. Essentially, the theory states that everyone should live as though God does exist because if they're wrong, they'll only have a finite loss but if they're right, they'll be rewarded infinite gains and avoid suffering from infinite punishment.



God exists

God does not exist

Belief in God

Eternal Joy

Nothing

Atheism

Eternal Suffering

Nothing



That being said, believing in God for the sake of believing in God is like being "good for goodness' sake." If your intentions behind "being good" are selfish in nature, such as being a means of waking up to presents on Christmas morning, then are you really "being good" at all? Even if it's logically sound and ultimately rewarding to believe in God, Pascal's reasoning is void of substance, and in order for someone to truly believe in anything, let alone a Supreme Being, I think there must be reason beyond personal gain. In the comic strip, Calvin doesn't necessarily believe in Santa per say; he merely believes in his own wants. 


For thousands of years, religious faith has been vehemently supported by some and dismissed with just as much vehemence by others. There are a few key arguments in support of God's existence, but as is the case with any philosophical debate, each argument opens up for a world of challenges and critiques. 


The Cosmological Argument

The cosmological argument, which was supported by Plato and Aristotle, is most often presented in terms of four "truth" clauses, the last of which stating the existence of God. Without excessive detail, the entire argument can be boiled down to the laws and standards of cause and effect. The clauses are as follows:

  1.  Every finite and dependent being has a cause.
  2. Nothing finite and dependent can cause itself.
  3. A casual chain cannot be of infinite length.
  4. Therefore, there must be a "first cause."

The Ontological Argument

The ontological argument is a little different. It was presented by Saint Anslem, and in simplest terms, is the idea that God exists because you can imagine God exists. Like the cosmological argument, it can be presented in terms of a number of clauses, the last of which stating the existence of God. Where the ontological argument differs however, is that it relies on the acknowledgement of four principle qualities that God must exhibit in order to be God. God must be omnipotent, God must be omniscient, God must be all-good, and God must exist. If those four qualities can be generally agreed on as conditional, then the clauses of the ontological argument can follow.

  1. God is a being than which none greater can be imagined.
  2. God exists as an idea of the mind.
  3. A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.
  4. Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God.
  5. But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God, for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.
  6. Therefore, God exists.

The Teleological Argument

The teleological argument was suggested and supported by Saint Thomas Aquinas. It supposes that the universe is so complex that it requires a maker in order to make sense of its existence, and that there is no way it could have been created by chance rather than by design. The teleological argument can be argued in terms of the anthropic principle, which is the philosophical premise that any data humans collect about the universe and its creation must be filtered by the fact that in order for it to be observable in the first place, it must be compatible with the existence of conscious human life. In simpler terms, theories of the universe must allow for human existence, and the presence of a Supreme Being is one of the few explanations that account for this necessity. 

Take the Big Bang theory for example. In order for the Big Bang to have resulted in the creation of anything, let alone in the creation of sentient life, its explosive force had to be within 1 part in 10^60th of what it actually was. The percentage difference in the force of the Big Bang that could have still accommodated the possibility of life was literally 0.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001%. If it had been any weaker, the universe would have instantly collapsed in on itself due to gravity, and if it had been any stronger, its particles would have dispersed into thin air. Humanity's existence is like a house of cards: it's so improbable that if one single piece were removed or changed, the entire structure would fall apart. To me, God is the only explanation.

The Argument For Morality

In my opinion, the argument of morality is one of the most convincing. It suggests that because humanity has at least some innate morality, God must exist. It's summarized by C.S. Lewis in his Mere Christianity: "conscience reveals to us a moral law whose source cannot be found in the natural world, thus pointing to a supernatural Lawgiver." Oftentimes an individual's sense of morality opposes their personal interests and desires, and even if one doesn't follow their morality, there's almost always an inherent sense of guilt that accompanies that decision. Without a "supernatural Lawgiver," a human being's only inclination would be towards their own personal fulfillment.


* * * * * 


Of course, all of these arguments can and have been refuted in many ways by many people. I'm sure you've heard, or maybe even used the age-old "if God is so powerful, can he create a mountain so heavy he couldn't move it?" rebuttal. Besides, if God exists, why is there so much hurt in the world? What about free will? Or hate crimes committed in God's name? Some of these questions will be answered from my perspective in the weeks to come, and some of them won't. But ultimately, I feel that at the core of my being, there's inviolable love, life, morality, and purpose that surpasses own judgement, and even though there are still questions left unanswered and mysteries left unknown, that's why I believe in God.

Friday, September 4, 2020

Reasons Why "I Think; Therefore I Am" Is Fundamentally Flawed (Perspectives Part 1)

September 04, 2020 3

The month of August, although it has been taxing at times, has also been pretty eventful in terms of my academics (though I can't say the same about the productivity of my blog). I took an online Intro to Philosophy course as well as two RCM exams, and even though I would have liked to keep up my writing in the meantime, I was fairly swamped as it was. The chaos of the past few weeks is finally starting to die down though, and I thought I would ease back into Reasons Why with a blog series called Perspectives, outlining my personal perspectives as well as the perspectives of other scholars on a few of the metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical concept I learned about in my philosophy course this summer. I found the nature of the course's required readings especially fascinating because when combined, they read more-so as conversations rather than objective texts. Each successive paper built on the last, whether deliberately or coincidentally, and it was highly fulfilling to indulge in that on-going discussion with my own opinions and beliefs. I can only hope that this blog series will serve as an invitation to partake in the conversation yourself, because it's certainly a worthwhile one to have.


Learn Liberty | Happy birthday to René Descartes, father of methodological  skepticism


You may have heard of French philosopher Rene Descartes' famous-to-some-but-infamous-to-others statement: "cogito ergo sum," or perhaps more recognizably: "I think; therefore I am." This widely-debated declaration was first stated in Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, and has since been quoted, requoted, and misquoted time and time again. 


Descartes' was one of the first and most influential skeptics, and his objective in recording his meditations was to detach himself from any assumptions and beliefs that had reasonable cause for doubt, and consequently, to discover through logic and reasoning which elements of his experience truly existed. In order to do so, Descartes starts off his first meditation by unpacking some of the supposed absolutes that people often rely on as starting points for determining what is true. For example, he acknowledges that sensory experiences such as sight and touch are widely accepted as absolute truths, but he rejects sensory data as a reliable starting point because no sound evidence exists to prove that those experiences are not products of the imagination. Hallucinations and dreams can be just as engaging and stimulating to the senses as conscious encounters, but have no more validity than a story or a fairytale.


Once he has removed himself from the biases of doubtful absolutes, Descartes expands with his second meditation by taking a dualistic perspective (separating the human mind from the human body) and identifying the mind as the only indisputable basis for determining what is true. From this line of reasoning emerges Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” which refers to proof of existence based solely on the ability to form thought. 


Descartes' methods aren't convincing to me, but they do have their strengths, one of which being their acknowledgement that there are many things we accept as being true merely because we have been accustomed to accept them as such. Descartes insists on discovering a completely objective starting point—if such a thing exists— and eliminates as much bias from his reasoning as possible. That kind of objectivity is valuable because when people's beliefs are based solely on subjective constructs, they become unstable and unsound.


Another merit of Descartes’ method is its opposition of materialism. Materialism is the philosophical theory that nothing exists except that which can be experienced with the senses, and it presents a number of problems, the central one being that human societies rely on and are held together by unseen things— ethics, morality, justice, etc. Since Descartes believes the foundation of reality to be a product of the mind, he acknowledges the existence of the unseen, an acknowledgement that I consider to be highly valuable in navigating and fully grasping the world. 


Despite its strengths however, Descartes’ position, which is purely based on doubt and suspicion, has essentially created a closed feedback loop in that none of his beliefs can be reasonably disputed while still supporting his disbeliefs. Descartes opens by stating, “we may, generally speaking, doubt about all things and especially about material things, at least so long as we have no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have hitherto possessed.” His arguments disregard science, divinity, and sensory data, and are thus indisputable because any argument one may raise against his claims would have to appeal to one of those bases of knowledge to make its case. For example, a neuroscientist might argue that thoughts are the results of chemical reactions transmitted via the dendrites of neurons, which implies that they are no different than other forms of sensory data, but because Descartes starts off by discounting biological science, that kind of a rebuttal would be completely senseless. This philosophical method is contradictory however, because after disregarding physical sciences such as physics and medicine, Descartes goes on to use psychological sciences to prove his conclusion that the mind is the only absolute. He writes: “Arithmetic, Geometry and other sciences of that kind which only treat of things that are very simple and very general, without taking great trouble to ascertain whether they are actually existent or not, contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides, and it does not seem possible that truths so clear and apparent can be suspected of any falsity.” Descartes chooses which sources of knowledge to accept and which ones to disregard based on whether or not they support his personal beliefs, and because of this, it is impossible to dispute his opinion. 


A number of philosophers have tried to refute however, including David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Baruch Spinoza— most of whom were monists (they believed that the human mind and the human body were unified and inseparable). Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature suggests that there is no proof that one is the same “thinking thing” from one moment to another. Descartes states in his meditations: “I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me,” and Hume uses this admittance to the possibility that memories can be false to support his own opposing view. 


Additionally, Nietzsche's argument is formed around the fact that Descartes bases his evidence for existence on the thought processes in his mind because he has rejected external data as a grounds for proving existence. Nietzsche argued that internal thoughts cannot be separated from external data, because the only reason thoughts exist is because external data, such as social constructs and interactions, put them there.


Whether or not it is sound in reasoning though, the fundamental problem with Descartes' model is that it isn't the kind of philosophy one can live by, because it doesn't play out in day to day interactions. Descartes was a white, upper-class male in a society where he had the privilege to study and think about logic and philosophy, but personally I can't picture myself overlooking physical pain, fear, or heartache in any situation that really presented it. If Descartes were surrounded by hungry predators, caught in the hold of a capsizing ship, or trapped in a burning building, I doubt he would have the presence of mind to uphold that he "can't say for sure that [he] now sees the flames, hears the wood crackling, and feels the heat of the fire."


And that's why "I think; therefore I am" is fundamentally flawed.